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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine writing a check to a local non-profit organization only to discover 
months later that the government has used your charitable deed to revoke your 
United States citizenship.  The group to which you made an innocent donation has 
been labeled a terrorist organization and your check is considered “providing 
material support” to a terrorist group.  Imagine further that your contribution is used 
as prima facie evidence establishing your intent to renounce your United States 
citizenship.  This evidence is then used to strip you of your citizenship and leave you 
stateless in your own country.  This may seem extreme, but if a proposed legislation 
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entitled the “Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003” becomes law, this 
seemingly outlandish scenario will become a very real and frightening possibility. 
On February 7, 2003, a confidential draft of this proposed legislation, the 
“Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003,” more commonly known as “Patriot 
Act II,” was released to the public by the Center for Public Integrity.1  This proposed 
legislation was drafted by the staff of Attorney General John Ashcroft and sent to 
Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert and Vice President Richard Cheney on January 
10, 2003.2  Up until this draft was leaked to the Center for Public Integrity, the 
Justice Department denied that any such legislation was even being planned.3  If 
passed, this proposed Patriot Act II will effect a bold, sweeping expansion of the 
USA Patriot Act passed in the wake of September 11, 2001.4  The original USA 
Patriot Act was passed on October 26, 2001, just six weeks after the terrorist 
attacks.5  The USA Patriot Act, which passed with little debate, provided for major 
changes to federal criminal, immigration, banking, and intelligence law in the name 
of anti-terrorism.6  These changes have led critics to question whether the balance 
between liberty and security has been thrown off kilter.7  Patriot Act II seeks to 
extend the government’s power to limit civil liberties even further.8  
Section 501 of Patriot Act II, which threatens Americans’ citizenship, is among 
the most alarming provisions of this draft legislation.9  Section 501, entitled 
“Expatriation of Terrorists,” provides for denationalization of citizens if the 
government determines that they have joined or provided material support to terrorist 
organizations.10  Further, Section 501 takes the unprecedented action of declaring 
that involvement with a terrorist group would be prima facie evidence of intent to 
                                                                
1Charles Lewis & Adam Mayle, Special Report: Justice Dept. Drafts Sweeping Expansion 
of Anti-Terrorism Act: Center Publishes Secret Draft of ‘Patriot II’ Legislation (Feb. 7, 2003) 
at 
http://www.publicintegrity.org/dtaweb/report.asp?ReportID=502&L1=10&L2=10&L3=0&L4
=0&L5=0 (last visited Feb. 19, 2004). 
2See Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003, draft Jan. 9, 2003 at 
http://www.publicintegrity.org/dtaweb/downloads/Story_01_020703_Doc_1.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 19, 2004).  
3See Lewis & Mayle, supra note 1. 
4See id. 
5See id. 
6See Donald A. Downs & Erik Kinnunen, Symposium Issue: Civil Liberties in a Time of 
Terror: Article: A Response to Anthony Lewis: Civil Liberties in a New Kind of War, 2003 
Wis. L. Rev. 385, 387 (2003). 
7See id. at 387. 
8See id. at 388. 
9See Joanne Mariner, Patriot Act II’s Attack on Citizenship: Denationalization as 
Punishment, CounterPunch, March 8, 2003, at http://www.counterpunch.org/ 
mariner03082003.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2004). 
10See Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003, Section 501, 78-79, draft, Jan. 9, 2003 
at http://www.publicintegrity.org/dtaweb/downloads/Story_01_020703_Doc_1.pdf. (last 
visited Feb. 19, 2004) [hereinafter “Patriot Act II”]. 
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relinquish citizenship.11  Section 501 of Patriot Act II will extend the government’s 
power and threaten not just loss of civil liberties, but loss of citizenship itself.12   
Citizenship is viewed as “man’s basic right for it is nothing less than the right to 
have rights.”13  The Constitution protects this most fundamental right by prohibiting 
the government from denationalizing citizens without their consent.14  The Supreme 
Court has held that involuntary denationalization of citizens is prohibited by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.15  Further, the Court has held that use of denationalization 
as punishment is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual 
punishment.16  Section 501 of Patriot Act II, as proposed, violates both of these 
constitutional protections of citizenship by reinstating the government’s power to 
denationalize citizens as a punishment for involvement with alleged terrorist 
organizations regardless of a person’s intent to relinquish citizenship.  
This Note will examine the rise and fall of denationalization in the United States 
and argue that Section 501 of Patriot Act II, which seeks to revive denationalization 
by amending the Immigration and Nationality Act, will be unconstitutional if passed 
by Congress in its present form.  Part II of this Note will examine the history of 
denationalization in the United States.  The development of expatriation legislation 
shows an early confusion of the status of citizenship and the right of a citizen to 
expatriate himself.  Judicial response to this legislation shows an initial deference to 
Congress allowing for denationalization of citizens.  Eventually, however, the 
Supreme Court recognized the constitutional limitations on the power of Congress to 
revoke citizenship and established the basic principle that all United States citizens 
have the right to remain citizens unless they voluntarily relinquish this right. 
Part III explores in detail the proposed amendments to the Immigration and 
Nationality Act in Section 501 of Patriot Act II that provide for a revival of 
denationalization.  This section also discusses the potential for abuses that may result 
if this legislation is enacted, as suggested by several critics of Patriot Act II, 
including the use of denationalization against citizens who are members of groups 
that express unpopular political views or even using denationalization as a way to 
detain individuals indefinitely once they have lost their rights as citizens. 
Part IV discusses why Patriot Act II is an unconstitutional attempt to strip 
Americans of their citizenship, rather than a way to protect our country from 
terrorism.  This section focuses on the constitutional protections provided for 
citizenship by the Fourteenth Amendment, and emphasizes Patriot Act II’s attempt to 
overcome these protections through eliminating the government’s burden  to prove a 
citizen’s intent to renounce citizenship by a preponderance of evidence.  Part IV also 
analyzes Section 501 of Patriot Act II’s use of denationalization as a punishment 
which has been held unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.  This analysis 
emphasizes the value of citizenship to individuals and explores the potential for 
                                                                
11See id. 
12See generally Lewis & Mayle, supra note 1; Mariner, supra note 9. 
13See Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting). 
14
 See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967). 
15Id. at 268. 
16See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
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statelessness that would result from denationalization under Patriot Act II.    In 
conclusion, this Note recommends that if presented with Patriot Act II, Congress 
should reject this proposed legislation because of its unconstitutional attempt to 
revive denationalization. 
II.  HISTORY OF DENATIONALIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
The history of denationalization17 and expatriation18 in the United States shows a 
movement toward prohibiting the government from revoking citizenship unless the 
citizen himself manifests an intention to terminate citizenship.19  The Supreme 
Court’s examination of the constitutional limits on the power of Congress to enact 
expatriation legislation has founded the principle that “forcible destruction of 
citizenship” through denationalization is prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment.20  
This conclusion by the Supreme Court has resolved the confusion between the 
protected right of all citizens to expatriate themselves and the prohibited act of 
denationalizing citizens regardless of their intent.21  This led to the “consensus that 
an American citizen, natural born or naturalized, has a constitutional right to remain 
a citizen unless he/she voluntarily assents to relinquish citizenship.”22  An 
examination of American expatriation legislation and the Supreme Court’s response 
to this legislation shows that Patriot Act II would violate the constitutional protection 
of Americans from denationalization by the government. 
A.  Historical Overview of American Expatriation Legislation 
For the first hundred years of United States history, Congress rarely enacted 
denationalization legislation.23  In fact, early concerns over loss of citizenship 
revolved around expatriation, not denationalization.24  Use of the terms 
“expatriation” and “denationalization” as interchangeable concepts in loss of 
citizenship law has been a major source of confusion.25  Expatriation is a citizen’s 
                                                                
17Denationalization is the revocation of citizenship by the government pursuant to statute 
regardless of the citizen’s intent.  See Elwin Griffith, Expatriation and the American Citizen, 
31 HOW. L.J. 453, 459 n.57, 462 n.70 (1988). 
18True expatriation is viewed as a voluntary surrender of citizenship made by the citizen 
himself.  See id. at 459 n.57, 462 n.70. 
19See Alan G. James, Expatriation in the United States: Precept and Practice Today and 
Yesterday, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 853, 854-55 (1990). 
20See Afroyim, 387 U.S. 253; James, supra note 19, at 855 (recognizing the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Afroyim as establishing the principle that the Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibits denationalization). 
21See James, supra note 19, at 855. 
22Id. 
23See J.M. Spectar, To Ban or Not to Ban an American Taliban?  Revocation of 
Citizenship & Statelessness in a Statecentric System, 39 CAL. W. L. REV. 263, 281 (2003). 
24See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Theories of Loss of Citizenship, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1471, 
1475 (1986). 
25See Steven S. Goodman, Note, Protecting Citizenship: Strengthening the Intent 
Requirement in Expatriation Proceedings, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 341, 344 n.14 (1988). 
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voluntary relinquishment of citizenship.26  In contrast, denationalization is “the 
forcible divestiture of an individual’s citizenship by the government.”27  Frequently, 
the government will use the term expatriation for government actions that are 
actually denationalization under the premise that deprivation of citizenship is merely 
a formalization of an individual’s voluntary action to renounce citizenship.28  
Regardless of the term used, any action of the government to revoke a person’s 
citizenship without his assent should be viewed as denationalization.29  
In 1868, Congress passed the first Expatriation Act.30  This Act formally 
recognized the right of expatriation possessed by all citizens stating that “the right of 
expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all people, indispensable to the 
enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”31  The purpose 
of this legislation was to protect naturalized U.S. citizens who returned to their native 
countries.32  This initial recognition of a right of expatriation for citizens, which was 
meant to protect citizens, was eventually used as the basis for the government to 
revoke citizenship.33  By establishing that Americans could renounce their allegiance, 
this allowed the government to argue that certain objective conduct was evidence of 
expatriation and led to further legislation providing for the denationalization of U.S. 
citizens.34 
Several decades after enacting the first Expatriation Act, Congress passed the 
Expatriation Act of 1907, which was the first statute to identify specific acts that 
would lead to loss of United States citizenship.35  This Act provided that expatriation 
occurred if a citizen was naturalized in, or swore allegiance to, a foreign state, or if a 
naturalized citizen resided in a foreign county for a certain length of time.36  The Act 
also provided that expatriation occurred for any American woman who married a 
foreigner under the theory that a woman takes the nationality of her husband.37  The 
                                                                
26See id. 
27Id. 
28Id. 
29See J.P. Jones, Comment, Limiting Constitutional Denationalization After Afroyim, 17 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 121, 123 n.11 (1979). 
30See Griffith, supra note 17, at 457. 
31See Aleinikoff, supra note 24, at 1475 (quoting Expatriation Act, Ch. 249, 15 Stat. 223 
(1868)). 
32See id. 
33See id. at 1476. 
34Id. 
35See Griffith, supra note 17, at 457.  In 1906, Congress responded to the problems caused 
by a major increase in immigration and naturalization in the United States by establishing a 
commission “to examine into the subjects of citizenship, expatriation and protection abroad.”  
See James, supra note 19, at 873 (quoting S. Res. 30, 59th Cong. (1st Sess. 1906)).  The report 
from this commission was used to create the bill that became the Expatriation Act of 1907.  Id. 
at 874. 
36See Griffith, supra note 17, at 457-58. 
37See Aleinikoff, supra note 24, at 1476. 
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main goal of the Act was to deal with the problems of dual nationality; however, it 
led to further problems of citizens expatriating themselves without realizing it 
because the act defined circumstances in which it would infer an individual’s 
assent.38  This caused a shift in focus from an individual’s right of expatriation to 
“the government’s right to prescribe the formula for an individual’s loss of 
citizenship,” and led to statutory denationalization.39 
The Nationality Act of 1940 expanded even further grounds for 
denationalization.40  For the first time, Congress included acts that did not involve 
the assumption of a new nationality as grounds for loss of American citizenship.41  
This legislation provided for loss of citizenship for conduct including: serving in 
foreign armed services, voting in a foreign election, accepting certain offices in a 
foreign state, being convicted of wartime desertion, and committing treason.42  In 
1944, loss of citizenship for leaving the United States during wartime to avoid 
military service was added to the list.43  All of these grounds for expatriation were 
codified by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.44  This continual extension 
of the government’s power over expatriating acts transformed what was meant 
initially to be a system recognizing citizens’ voluntary expatriation into involuntary 
denationalization of citizens by the government.45   
Over the course of their history, these statutes were frequently challenged on 
grounds of constitutionality.46  Supreme Court rulings declaring denationalization as 
unconstitutional have slowly returned the interpretation of expatriation legislation to 
its original intent – a method for individuals to voluntarily renounce their citizenship, 
not to have it forcibly taken away by the government.47  In response to the Supreme 
                                                                
38See Griffith, supra note 17, at 458. 
39Id. 
40See Spectar, supra note 23, at 281. 
41Leonard B. Boudin, Involuntary Loss of American Nationality, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1510, 
1513 (1960).  It is important to note that the terms “nationality” and “citizenship” are often 
regarded as synonymous and are both used to describe a person’s membership in their country.  
See P. WEIS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-5 (1956).  
42See Spectar, supra note 23, at 281. 
43See Aleinikoff, supra note 24, at 1477. 
44See Griffith, supra note 17, at 459. 
45See Boudin, supra note 41, at 1514.  Boudin states that the process of the government 
transforming voluntary expatriation into denationalization is marked by three significant 
tendencies: (1) The continuous expansion of the number of acts deemed evidence of so-called 
voluntary expatriation.  (2) A shift from rebuttable presumption and temporary suspension to 
conclusive acts with permanent effect.  (3) The change of the basic standard so as to infer an 
intent to expatriate from conduct not involving a transfer of allegiance to another country.  Id. 
at 1514-15. 
46See, e.g., Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915) (challenging the expatriation of 
women who marry foreigners as provided in the 1907 Act); Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 
(1958) (challenging provision that authorized expatriation for citizen that had voted in foreign 
election); Trop, 356 U.S. 86 (challenging expatriation for wartime desertion). 
47See James, supra note 19, at 854-55. 
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Court’s decisions, the most current version of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 
amended in 1987, expressly states that a citizen can only lose his citizenship if he 
performs an expatriating act voluntarily with the intent to relinquish United States 
citizenship.48  Through this amendment Congress has brought the statute into 
conformity with the Constitution and officially recognized that the government does 
not have the authority to involuntarily denationalize citizens.49  Ignoring the 
unconstitutionality of denationalization, Patriot Act II seeks to amend this statute and 
reassert the government’s power to strip people of their citizenship.50   
B.  Judicial Response to Congress’ Efforts to Denationalize Citizens 
Congressional enactment of these “expatriation” statutes led the Supreme Court 
to examine the constitutionality of denationalization.51  The initial uncertainty about 
the right of expatriation led to confusion between intentional expatriation by citizens 
and involuntary denationalization of citizens by the government.52  The Supreme 
Court was faced with the question of whether Congress has the power to determine 
through legislation which voluntary acts of citizens will result in their expatriation.53  
Early Supreme Court decisions show that the Court was very deferential to Congress 
and sustained most of the early denationalization statutes.54  However, the Supreme 
Court gradually began to restrict the power of Congress during the 1950’s and 
1960’s, and struck down many expatriation statutes as unconstitutional.55  A review 
of the major Supreme Court decisions on expatriation and denationalization shows a 
movement towards the recognition that the Constitution protects the right of 
citizenship and Congress is “powerless to take away a person’s citizenship without 
[that] person’s assent.”56  
1.  Initial Judicial Deference to Congress 
Early judicial acceptance of denationalization of citizens by the government is 
demonstrated by Mackenzie v. Hare,57 which tested the Expatriation Act of 1907.58  
                                                                
488 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (2003).  The current Immigration and Nationality Act only provides 
for seven specific acts of expatriation.  Id. 
49See David A. Martin, Comment, The Civic Republican Ideal for Citizenship, and for Our 
Common Life, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 301, 313 (1994). 
50See Mariner, supra note 9. 
51See Spectar, supra note 23, at 282. 
52See Griffith, supra note 17, at 459.  The confusion between expatriation and 
denationalization can be traced back to the common law doctrine of perpetual allegiance, 
which was rejected by the 1868 Expatriation Act.  Id. at 459-60.    
53Id. at 460. 
54See Aleinikoff, supra note 24, at 1478. 
55See James, supra note 19, at 855. 
56See Griffith, supra note 17, at 468. 
57239 U.S. 299 (1915). 
58See Griffith, supra note 17, at 458. 
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Mackenzie was a native born U.S. citizen who lost her citizenship by marrying a 
foreigner under the act.59  She challenged the act claiming that the Constitution 
protected her right to citizenship and that the Constitution did not provide Congress 
the express power of expatriation.60  The Supreme Court upheld the right of 
Congress to denationalize citizens, concluding that this was an implied power that 
was necessary to the express power of protecting U.S. sovereignty.61  This decision 
shows the Court’s early disregard of the intent of a citizen to retain citizenship.62  
The Court focused on the voluntary act of marrying a foreigner, and concluded that 
taking such action with notice of the consequences could be used to establish 
expatriation regardless of whether there was an actual intent to relinquish 
citizenship.63 
In 1958, the issue of denationalization was again faced by the Supreme Court in 
two major cases that show a shift in the Court’s view of denationalization.  The first 
case, Perez v. Brownell,64 was a controversial decision by a divided Court that 
continued the trend of judicial deference to Congress.  The Court held that the 
Nationality Act of 1940 authorized Congress to strip a person of his citizenship for 
voting in a foreign election or remaining outside the United States to avoid military 
service, regardless of whether the person intended to relinquish his citizenship.65  
Perez was a native-born U.S. citizen who moved with his parents to Mexico and 
remained there to avoid military service during World War II.66  When he sought to 
reenter the United States as a citizen, he admitted that he had avoided military 
service and also that he had voted in political elections in Mexico.67  Based on these 
admissions, Perez was deemed to have expatriated himself and he was deported.68   
The majority in Perez reiterated the idea that Congress had the power to 
denationalize citizens based on the Necessary and Proper Clause of the 
Constitution.69  The Court reasoned that Congress has the power to deal with foreign 
affairs and controlling the withdrawal of citizenship may be necessary to avoid 
embarrassment in foreign relations.70 With this deferral to the power of Congress,71 
                                                                
59Mackenzie, 239 U.S. at 306-07. 
60
 Id. at 308, 310. 
61Id. at 311-12. 
62See Griffith, supra note 17, at 458 (discussing the Court’s deference to Congress’s 
inherent power of sovereignty and the lack of a statutory requirement for a citizen to intend to 
relinquish citizenship). 
63Mackenzie, 239 U.S. at 311-12. 
64356 U.S. 44 (1958), overruled by Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967). 
65Perez, 356 U.S. at 61-62. 
66Id. at 46. 
67Id. 
68Id. at 46-47. 
69Id. at 60-62. 
70Id. at 59-60. 
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the Court overtly rejected the idea that a citizen’s intent should be considered, stating 
that “it would be a mockery of this Court’s decisions to suggest that a person, in 
order to lose his citizenship, must intend or desire to do so.”72 
Chief Justice Warren wrote an important dissent in Perez that would lay the 
foundation for future Supreme Court decisions rejecting the power of Congress to 
denationalize citizens.73  The Chief Justice condemned denationalization as “not 
within the letter or the spirit of the powers with which our Government was 
endowed” and firmly concluded that the government is without power to revoke the 
citizenship of any American, native-born or naturalized.74  Chief Justice Warren 
drew this conclusion from the Fourteenth Amendment protection of citizenship for 
all people born or naturalized in the United States.75  This amendment provides a 
constitutional right of citizenship and the Constitution does not provide any 
corresponding provision authorizing divestment of citizenship by the government.76  
Consequently, the Chief Justice pronounced that the Constitution prohibits Congress 
from revoking citizenship without assent from the individual.77 
2.  Judicial Recognition of the Unconstitutionality of Denationalization 
The second major case in 1958 to address denationalization, Trop v. Dulles,78 
shows the beginning of judicial recognition that Congress is prohibited by the 
Constitution from revoking citizenship involuntarily.  Trop v. Dulles was decided on 
same day as Perez v. Brownell, but the outcome was very different.79  Trop was a 
soldier who was convicted of desertion during World War II.80  Several years later 
when he applied for a passport, he was notified that he had lost his citizenship as a 
                                                          
71This deferral to Congress was based on the “longstanding belief that Congress could 
both define expatriation acts and compel an individual to accept the consequences of 
committing any of these acts.”  See Goodman, supra note 25, at 344. 
72Perez, 356 U.S. at 61. 
73Perez, 356 U.S. at 62 (Warren, C.J. dissenting).  See also Goodman, supra note 25, at 
344 (recognizing the prominence of Chief Justice Warren’s dissent in future cases). 
74Perez, 356 U.S. at 77-78 (Warren, C.J. dissenting).   
75Id. at 65-66.  The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “All persons born or naturalized 
in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and 
of the State wherein they reside.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
76Perez, 356 U.S. at 65-66 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).   
77Id.  Chief Justice Warren emphasized that the right of voluntary expatriation remains a 
natural and inherent right of all people.  Id. at 66-67.  
78356 U.S. 86. 
79A third case involving the Nationality Act of 1940, Nishikawa v. Dulles, was also 
decided on the same day as Trop and Perez, however, this case did not address the 
constitutionality of denationalization, rather it addressed the burden of proof required for 
expatriation.  Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958).  In Nishikawa, the Court held that the 
government bears the burden to prove that an expatriating act was voluntarily performed by 
clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence.  Id. at 135. 
80Trop, 356 U.S. at 87-88. 
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result of his desertion under the Nationality Act of 1940.81  In this case, Chief Justice 
Warren, who had strongly dissented in Perez, wrote the majority opinion.82  The 
Court held that stripping a person of his citizenship as punishment for wartime 
desertion was unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment because 
denationalization is a form of cruel and unusual punishment.83   
In Trop, Chief Justice Warren expanded on his views of citizenship as a 
fundamental right that cannot be revoked by the government.84  He stated, “It is my 
conviction that citizenship is not subject to the general powers of the National 
Government and therefore cannot be divested in the exercise of those powers.”85  The 
opinion then went on to recognize the removal of Trop’s citizenship as a punishment 
for his desertion, because there was no other legitimate purpose for the statute other 
than to punish.86  The Court concluded that denationalization is a cruel and unusual 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment and is, therefore, unconstitutional.87  In 
reaching this conclusion, the Court emphasized the value of citizenship and the 
potential for rendering individuals stateless which would essentially destroy a 
person’s political existence.88  
The Court completely reversed the view of Congressional denationalization it 
espoused in Perez just nine years later in Afroyim v. Rusk.89  In Afroyim, the Court 
held that Congress has no power under the Constitution to strip a person of 
citizenship unless the person voluntarily relinquishes citizenship.90  The petitioner in 
                                                                
81Id. at 88. 
82Id. at 87.  Justice Brennan proved to be the pivotal vote in this decision because he 
changed his position from that of the majority in Perez.  In his concurring opinion, he found 
that the statute was unconstitutional because he could not see a connection between the statute 
and a legitimate Congressional purpose under the war power.  Id. at 114 (Brennan, J., 
concurring).  Brennan, however, still supported the Perez majority’s view that Congress did 
have the power to denationalize citizens.  Trop, 356 U.S. at 105-07 (Brennan, J., concurring).    
83Id.  at 103.  The Eighth Amendment provides that “excessive bail shall not be required, 
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. 
VIII. 
84Although Chief Justice Warren’s view was that Congress did not have the power to 
revoke citizenship, the majority was still unable to agree on this issue.  The majority’s 
conclusion was only that Congress could not use denationalization as a punishment.  See 
Jones, supra note 29, at 136. 
85Trop, 356 U.S. at 92.  The Chief Justice also reiterated that a citizen may still voluntarily 
relinquish or abandon citizenship by express language or language and conduct that exhibit a 
renunciation of citizenship.  Id. 
86Id. at 97.   
87Id. at 103. 
88Id. at 101. 
89387 U.S. 253 (1967); see Jones, supra note 29, at 137. 
90Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 268.  The Court stated: 
We hold that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to and does, protect every 
citizen of this Nation against a congressional forcible destruction of his citizenship, 
whatever his creed, color or race.  Our holding does no more than to give to this 
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Afroyim was held by the lower court to have lost his American citizenship for voting 
in a foreign election under the same section of the Nationality Act of 1940 that was 
held to be constitutional in Perez v. Brownell.91  In reversing the lower court’s 
decision, the Supreme Court expressly overruled Perez v. Brownell and adopted 
Chief Justice Warren’s dissenting view that the Fourteenth Amendment prevents 
Congress from revoking citizenship.92  The Court found that Americans, born or 
naturalized in the United States, are granted full citizenship under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and all people retain this citizenship unless they voluntarily relinquish 
it.93  Further, the Court stated that the Constitution contains no provision, either 
express or implied, granting the Government the power to strip people of their 
citizenship.94 
The impact of the Afroyim decision on the power of Congress to denationalize 
was immense.95  For the first time, the Supreme Court recognized that an inherent 
right of citizenship exists for all Americans under the Constitution and denounced 
the power of Congress to revoke citizenship without assent of the citizen.96  This 
decision has established the view of citizenship and denationalization that is 
followed in the United States today.97  Afroyim, however, left one important issue 
unresolved regarding the government’s ability to revoke citizenship.  Although 
Afroyim firmly established that Congress can only strip a person of citizenship if he 
voluntarily relinquishes it, this decision failed to address whether such “voluntary 
relinquishment” requires a specific intent to relinquish citizenship along with the 
voluntary commission of an expatriating act.98  The issue of intent was resolved by 
the Supreme Court in Vance v. Terrazas.99 
Vance v. Terrazas,100 decided in 1980, involved the expatriation of Laurence 
Terrazas, a dual national of the United States and Mexico.  While a student in 
                                                          
citizen that which is his own, a constitutional right to remain a citizen in a free country 
unless he voluntarily relinquishes that citizenship.  
Id. 
91Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 255. 
92Id. at 267-68 (stating that “[b]ecause the Fourteenth Amendment prevents Congress from 
[revoking citizenship], we agree with THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s dissent in the Perez case that 
the Government is without power to rob a citizen of his citizenship”). 
93Id. at 262. 
94Id. at 257. 
95See James, supra note 19, at 889.  James states that Afroyim was “a watershed in the law 
of expatriation.  It delineated, probably once and for all, the rights of the citizen and the 
powers of Congress with respect to those rights.”  Id. at 890. 
96Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 268; see also Goodman, supra note 25, at 345-46.   
97See Griffith, supra note 17, at 492.   
98See Goodman, supra note 25, at 346.  The Afroyim Court also used the vague term 
“assent” to describe voluntary relinquishment which added to the confusion over the exact 
nature of “assent” and what it required.  See Griffith, supra note 17, at 477. 
99See Goodman, supra note 25, at 347. 
100444 U.S. 252 (1980). 
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Mexico, Terrazas applied for a certificate of Mexican nationality, swearing 
allegiance to Mexico while expressly renouncing his United States citizenship.101 A 
few months later, Terrazas was issued a certificate of loss of nationality after it was 
concluded that he had voluntarily renounced his United States citizenship under 
Section 349 (a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.102  Terrazas denied 
renouncing his citizenship, and through a series of appeals debating the requirement 
of specific intent and the burden of proof required to establish such intent, the case 
reached the Supreme Court.103  
In Terrazas, the Court reaffirmed its holding in Afroyim that every citizen has a 
constitutional right to retain his citizenship unless he voluntarily relinquishes it.104  
The Court then clarified Afroyim’s use of the term “assent” to describe the 
mandatory requirement of voluntariness.105  The Court concluded that “assent” to 
loss of citizenship means an intent to relinquish citizenship, thus establishing specific 
intent as a necessary element of voluntary expatriation.106  Further, the Court 
established that expatriating acts cannot be used as conclusive evidence of specific 
intent and there can be no presumption that an act has been performed with the intent 
to relinquish citizenship.107  The burden is on the government to prove specific intent 
to relinquish citizenship by a preponderance of the evidence.108 
Beginning with Trop v. Dulles, the Supreme Court has recognized constitutional 
limits on the power of Congress to denationalize citizens.109  In Afroyim v. Rusk and 
Vance v. Terrazas, the Court fully pronounced the principles that citizenship is 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, involuntarily revocation of citizenship 
through denationalization is unconstitutional, and the government must prove 
specific intent to relinquish citizenship in all cases involving expatriation.110  These 
decisions have formed the modern basis for United States law on the issue of 
                                                                
101Id. at 255. 
102Id. at 256. 
103Id. at 256-59.  Following the issue of the certificate of loss of nationality by the 
Department of State, Terrazas’ case was first reviewed by the Board of Appellate Review of 
the Department of State, which affirmed the decision.  Id. at 256.  Terrazas then brought suit 
in federal court, and the District Court concluded that the United States had proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he had voluntarily renounced his citizenship.  Id. at 257.  
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded holding that the evidentiary standard, as 
required by the Constitution, was “clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence” rather than 
just a preponderance of the evidence.  Id. at 257-58.  The Secretary of State appealed to the 
Supreme Court the issue of whether specific intent must be proved to establish voluntary 
expatriation.  Id. at 258-59. 
104Id. at 259-60. 
105Id. at 260. 
106Id. 
107Id. at 261, 268. 
108Id. at 268. 
109See 356 U.S. 86. 
110See 387 U.S. 253; 444 U.S. 252. 
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denationalization.111  Congress has accepted the constitutional standards expressed in 
these cases by incorporating their holdings into the statutory language of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act.112  It is in the context of these well established 
constitutional principles that the proposed legislation of Section 501 of Patriot Act II 
must be viewed. 
III.  PATRIOT ACT II, SECTION 501: EXPATRIATION OF TERRORISTS – A SUMMARY OF 
THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION 
The draft of the proposed Patriot Act II that has been leaked to the public is a 
voluminous and incredibly detailed extension of its predecessor, the USA Patriot 
Act, which expands the government’s powers in many areas in the name of anti-
terrorism.113  Tucked deep within the text of this draft is Section 501, entitled 
“Expatriation of Terrorists.”  Among all of the other sweeping changes in Patriot Act 
II, this section could easily be overlooked.  A cursory glance at this section may lead 
one to believe that it merely provides for another way for people to expatriate 
themselves.  However, critics of Patriot Act II have called attention to the real 
implications of Section 501.114  A thorough examination of Section 501 reveals that it 
is actually a veiled attempt by the government to revive denationalization as a 
punishment for terrorism under the premise of expatriation.115  
Section 501 of Patriot Act II seeks to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act 
to include terrorism as an expatriating act.116  Section 349 of the Immigration and 
                                                                
111See Griffith, supra note 17, at 492. 
112Id. 
113See Patriot Act II, supra note 10.   
114See Timothy H. Edgar, How “Patriot Act 2” Would Further Erode the Basic Checks on 
Government Power That Keep America Safe and Free, ACLU 6, Mar. 20, 2003, at 
http://www.cdt.org/security/patriot2/030320aclu.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2004); Nat Hentoff, 
Ashcroft Out of Control: Ominous Sequel to USA Patriot Act, The Village Voice, Feb. 28, 
2003 at http://www.villagevoice.com/issues/0310/hentoff.php. (last visited Jan. 24, 2004), see 
also Lewis & Mayle, supra note 1; Mariner, supra note 9. 
115See generally Mariner, supra note 9. 
116Patriot Act II, supra note 10.  The following is the complete text of Section 501: 
Expatriation of Terrorists: 
Section 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1481) is amended – 
(1) by amending subsection (a)(3) to read as follows: 
“(3)(A) entering, or serving in, the armed forces of a foreign state if— 
“(i) such armed forces are engaged in hostilities against the United States; 
or 
“(ii) such person serves as a commissioned or non-commissioned officer; 
or 
“(B) joining or serving in, or providing material support (as defined in 
section 2339A of title 18, United States Code) to, a terrorist 
organization designated under section 212(a)(3) or 219 or designated 
under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, if the 
organization is engaged in hostilities against the United States, its 
people, or its national security interests.”; and 
(2) by adding at the end of subsection (b) the following: “The voluntary commission 
or performance of an act described in subsection (a)(3)(A)(i) or (B) shall be 
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Nationality Act, codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1481, provides that a person who is a national 
of the United States by birth or naturalization shall lose his nationality by voluntarily 
performing certain enumerated activities with the intention of relinquishing United 
States nationality.117  The list of the seven expatriating acts specified by § 1481 
includes: obtaining naturalization in a foreign state;118 taking an oath of allegiance to 
a foreign state;119 serving in the armed forces of a foreign state, if the armed forces 
are engaged in hostilities against the United States or the person serves as a 
commissioned or noncommissioned officer;120 accepting or performing the duties of 
a government office of a foreign state;121 making a formal renunciation of United 
States nationality in a foreign state;122 making in the United States a formal written 
renunciation of nationality if our country is in a state of war;123 or committing an act 
of treason against the United States.124  
The first amendment proposed in Section 501 is directed specifically at changing 
the third expatriating act, serving in the armed forces of a foreign state engaged in 
hostilities against the United States.  Under Section 501 of Patriot Act II, subsection 
(a)(3) of § 1481 would be amended to include as an expatriating act: “joining in, or 
providing material support (as defined in section 2339A of title 18, United States 
Code) to, a terrorist organization designated under section 213(a)(3) or 219 . . ., if the 
organization is engaged in hostilities against the United States, its people, or its 
national security interests.”125  Such acts will result in loss of citizenship if performed 
voluntarily with intent to relinquish U.S. citizenship.126  Critics of Patriot Act II fear 
that its reliance on the over-broad definitions of “terrorist organization” and 
“providing material support” as defined by the USA Patriot Act will lead to ordinary 
people being labeled as terrorists and facing revocation of their citizenship.127  
The USA Patriot Act expanded the definition of “domestic terrorism” to include 
any activities that “involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the 
criminal laws of the United States.”128  This expansive definition covers virtually any 
group that participates in violence or destruction of property and could be used 
                                                          
prima facie evidence that the act was done with the intention of relinquishing 
United States nationality.”   
Id.  
1178 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (2003). 
1188 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(1). 
1198 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(2). 
1208 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(3). 
1218 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(4). 
1228 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(5). 
1238 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(6). 
1248 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(7). 
125See Patriot Act II, supra note 10. 
126Id. 
127See Edgar, supra note 114; Hentoff, supra note 114. 
128USA PATRIOT Act 802(a)(5), amending 18 U.S.C. § 2331. 
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against domestic political advocacy groups that engage in civil disobedience without 
any ties to international terrorism.129  Further, the extensive list of ways to provide 
“material support” to a terrorist organization could potentially lead to citizens 
unknowingly connecting themselves to a group labeled as such without any real 
participation in unlawful activities.130  In continuing the USA Patriot Act’s efforts to 
control terrorism within the United States, Patriot Act II creates the potential for 
denationalizing citizens who have no ties to any foreign state.   
Through its second proposed amendment, Section 501 crosses the line from 
merely recognizing terrorism as an additional expatriating act to allowing the 
government to denationalize citizens against their will by eliminating the 
government’s burden to prove a citizen’s intent to renounce citizenship.131  The 
second proposal in Section 501 of Patriot Act II effects a major, and controversial, 
change from the current version of the Immigration and Nationality Act by creating a 
presumption of intent to relinquish citizenship based solely on a person’s connection 
to a terrorist group.132  Section 501 provides that “the voluntary commission or 
performance of an [expatriating] act . . . shall be prima facie evidence that the act 
was done with the intention of relinquishing United States nationality.”133  An 
analysis of the section provided with the draft states that this provision would make 
it explicit that “the intent to relinquish nationality need not be manifested in words, 
but can be inferred from conduct.”134  This revision contradicts judicial interpretation 
of the Immigration and Nationality Act which emphasizes that there can be no 
presumption of intent based on conduct alone.135  Section 501 seeks to override the 
Supreme Court’s holding that the government bears the heavy burden of proving by 
a preponderance of the evidence that a citizen had intent to relinquish citizenship.136    
If passed, this unprecedented effort by the government to reassert its power of 
denationalization would establish that an act of joining or providing material support 
to a group labeled as a “terrorist organization” is prima facie evidence of an intent to 
                                                                
129See Downs & Kinnunen, supra note 6, at 388; see also Edgar, supra note 114 (stating 
that under the overbroad definition of international and domestic terrorism “diverse ‘direct-
action’ organizations, including Operation Rescue, the World Trade Organization protestors, 
and others could conceivably be labeled ‘terrorist organizations’”). 
13018 U.S.C. § 2339A (2003).  According to this section, the term “material support or 
resources” means currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, 
lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or 
identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, 
personnel, transportation, and other physical assets, except medicine or religious materials.  Id. 
131See generally Lewis & Mayle, supra note 1; Mariner, supra note 9; Hetnoff, supra note 
114.  
132Id. 
133See Patriot Act II, supra note 10 (emphasis added). 
134Id. 
135See Goodman, supra note 25, at 355. 
136See Terrazas, 444 U.S. at 268 (recognizing that presumption of voluntariness does not 
create a presumption of intent to expatriate). 
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renounce citizenship.137  This has caused great concern among opponents of Patriot 
Act II.138  Critics fear the potential for abuse that may occur if this proposal to infer 
intent to renounce citizenship from conduct passes.  For example, under this new 
standard, a person who makes a legitimate contribution to a non-profit organization 
could lose his or her citizenship if, even months later, the organization is deemed by 
the government to support terrorists.139  All the government would have to do is 
prove that the person voluntarily made the donation, not that they did so with the 
intent to renounce citizenship.140  Once a person has his citizenship revoked for 
joining or providing support to terrorists, the government can treat the person as an 
alien and subject him to potentially indefinite detention.141   
While the draft of Patriot Act II may be intended to expand its predecessor, the 
USA Patriot Act, and increase the protection to Americans from the threat of 
terrorism, it would introduce a serious threat to civil liberties.142  As shown by 
Section 501, Patriot Act II threatens not only civil liberties, but citizenship itself.  A 
review of the history of expatriation and denationalization in the United States has 
shown that the revival of denationalization proposed by Patriot Act II runs contrary 
to the basic constitutional principle pronounced by the Supreme Court in Afroyim 
that only citizens themselves can renounce their citizenship. 
IV.  ANALYSIS: PATRIOT ACT II – UNCONSTITUTIONAL  UNDER THE FOURTEENTH 
AND EIGHTH AMENDMENTS 
Patriot Act II has revived the dispute over whether Congress has the power under 
the Constitution to unilaterally denationalize citizens without their consent.143  This 
had been a major source of controversy throughout early American history up until 
the decisions of Afroyim and Terrazas.144  In those decisions, the Supreme Court 
finally settled the issue by declaring that citizenship is protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment and Congress has no power to revoke citizenship without citizens’ 
                                                                
137See Patriot Act II, supra note 10. 
138See Hetnoff, supra note 114.  Hetnoff poses the question that if intent can be inferred 
from conduct, who will do the “inferring?”  Id. 
139See Interview by Bill Moyers with Chuck Lewis, Executive Director, Center for Public 
Integrity (Feb. 7, 2003) at http://www.pbs.org/now/transcript/transcript_lewis2.html (last 
visited Feb. 19, 2004). 
140
 See generally id.; Lewis & Mayle, supra note 1; Hetnoff, supra note 114. 
141See Edgar, supra note 114 (describing how people who have their citizenship stripped 
are placed in “the same position as stateless undocumented immigrants who face potentially 
indefinite detention”). 
142See Downs & Kinnunen, supra note 6, at 388. 
143See generally Lewis & Mayle, supra note 1; Mariner, supra note 9; Hetnoff, supra note 
114. 
144See James, supra note 19, at 904 (describing how prior to the Afroyim decision the 
expatriation controversy was an ongoing problem and that there was no “clear understanding 
of the nature and extent of the power to expatriate American citizens”).     
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voluntary assent.145  Further, in Trop, the Court pronounced that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits using denationalization as a punishment.146  An analysis of 
Patriot Act II’s proposal to revoke the citizenship for joining or providing material 
support to a terrorist organization, applying the constitutional principles set forth by 
the Supreme Court, establishes that if Section 501 of Patriot Act II is enacted it will 
be unconstitutional under both the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments.  
A.  Fourteenth Amendment Protection of Citizens from Attempts  
of Government to Revoke Citizenship 
The drafters of Patriot Act II have initiated this proposed legislation under the 
theory that it is justified by the power to protect Americans and increase homeland 
security.147  The Constitution, however, prohibits Congress from granting itself the 
power to denationalize in the name of national security.148  First, the Fourteenth 
Amendment, as interpreted by Afroyim, grants all native-born or naturalized 
Americans citizenship and protects this citizenship from attempts of the government 
to revoke it without the assent of the citizen.149  Second, the Constitution does not 
expressly grant Congress the power to denationalize citizens or prescribe grounds for 
expatriation.150  Further, our federal system of government is based on the theory that 
the government is limited to expressly enumerated powers and is prohibited from 
implied powers except those necessary to carry out the express powers.151  This has 
led to the conclusion that Congress lacks the constitutional power to revoke 
citizenship and that expatriation can result only from the voluntary act of the citizen 
with the intent to renounce citizenship.152  Any attempts by the government to revoke 
                                                                
145See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967); Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980).  
Following the Court’s clear prohibition against denationalization in the Afroyim and Terrazas 
decisions, some believed that “the expatriation chronicle is as close to being finished as it is 
likely to be.”  See James, supra note 19, at 904.   
146Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
147In response to the leak of Patriot Act II, the Department of Justice issued a statement 
that “[t]he President expects all his cabinet departments that are involved in homeland 
security, including the Department of Justice, to make sure we are doing everything we can to 
protect the American people . . . . [T]he Department of Justice takes that responsibility 
seriously and discusses additional tools to protect the American people.”  Statement of 
Barbara Comstock, Director of Public Affairs, available at http://www.publicintegrity.org/ 
dtaweb/downloads/Story_01_020703_Doc_3.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2004). 
148See U.S. CONST. amend. X.  The Tenth Amendment states: “The powers not delegated 
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the people.”  Id.  
149Afroyim, 387 U.S. 253. 
150See John P. Roche, The Loss of American Nationality – The Development of Statutory 
Expatriation, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 25, 26 (1950); Charles Gordon, The Citizen and the State: 
Power of Congress to Expatriate American Citizens, 53 GEO. L.J. 315, 333 (1964). 
151See Thomas Tin Fah Huang, Loss of United States Citizenship by Expatriation: With 
Particular Reference to the Constitutional Aspects 9 (1958) (unpublished S.J.D. thesis, 
Harvard Law School) (on file with Cleveland-Marshall College of Law Library). 
152See Gordon, supra note 150, at 333. 
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a person’s citizenship against his will is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.153   
The extent of Congress’ authority to control loss of citizenship has been the 
major source of dispute throughout the expatriation cases.154  Early attempts to 
provide a justification for the power of Congress to denationalize were based on 
establishing it as an implied power through the Necessary and Proper clause.155  
Proponents of statutory expatriation first claimed that Congress had the power to 
denationalize as implied through its power over naturalization.156  The Constitution 
provides that Congress shall have the power “to establish an Uniform Rule of 
Naturalization.”157  Therefore, it was suggested that the power to grant citizenship 
should also infer a power to provide for loss of citizenship.158  This argument was 
rejected by early cases that addressed the naturalization power.  Chief Justice 
Marshall stated in Osborn v. Bank of United States that “the simple power of the 
national legislature is to prescribe a uniform rule of naturalization and the exercise of 
this power exhausts it, so far as respects the individual.”159  In United States v. Wong 
Kim Ark, the Supreme Court denounced the idea that denationalization was implied 
through the naturalization power stating that “the power of naturalization, vested in 
Congress by the Constitution, is a power to confer citizenship, not a power to take it 
away.”160 
After the rejection of denationalization as derived from Congress’ naturalization 
power, Congress’ asserted power to revoke citizenship was then justified through its 
“inherent power of sovereignty” in the area of foreign relations.161  The Supreme 
Court initially accepted this as a legitimate basis for upholding statutory 
denationalization by Congress.162  In Mackenzie, the Court stated that “[a]s a 
government, the United States is invested with all the attributes of sovereignty.  As it 
has the character of nationality it has the powers of nationality, especially those 
                                                                
153Afroyim, 387 U.S. 253. 
154See Gordon, supra note 150, at 333.  Gordon’s article, written prior to Afroyim and 
Vance, recognized two opposing views on the issue of Congress’ power to denationalize.  Id.  
One view rejected Congress’s power while the other implied such a power through the 
Necessary and Proper clause.  Id.  
155See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.  The Necessary and Proper clause provides that 
Congress shall have the power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution 
in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”  Id.  See 
also Gordon, supra note 150, at 333.  
156See Roche, supra note 150, at 26. 
157U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
158See Roche, supra note 150, at 26. 
15922 U.S. 738, 827 (1824). 
160169 U.S. 649, 703 (1898). 
161See Roche, supra note 150, at 27. 
162See Mackenzie, 239 U.S. 299; Perez, 356 U.S. 44. 
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which concern its relations and intercourse with other countries.”163  The Perez 
decision elaborated on the connection between this power of sovereignty in foreign 
relations and the power to denationalize through the Necessary and Proper Clause.164  
The Court questioned whether “the means, withdrawal of citizenship, [was] 
reasonably calculated to effect the end that [was] within the power of Congress to 
achieve, the avoidance of embarrassment in the conduct of our foreign relations.”165  
The Court answered affirmatively, bluntly stating that “[t]he termination of 
citizenship terminates the problem.”166   
The Court’s deference to an implied power of Congress to revoke citizenship has 
been replaced by its recognition of the rights of citizens founded in the 
Constitution.167  The implied power of Congress to denationalize has now been 
wholly rejected by the Supreme Court in light of its interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.168  The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[a]ll persons born or 
naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of 
the United States.”169  The Court considered the unequivocal language of this 
amendment and concluded that: 
There is no indication in these words of a fleeting citizenship, good at the 
moment it is acquired but subject to destruction by the Government at any 
time.  Rather the Amendment can most reasonably be read as defining a 
citizenship which a citizen keeps unless he voluntarily relinquishes it.  
Once acquired, this Fourteenth Amendment citizenship [is] not to be 
shifted, canceled or diluted at the will of the Federal Government, the 
States, or any other governmental unit.170 
This express grant of permanent right of citizenship to all native born or 
naturalized Americans establishes the principle that only citizens can relinquish their 
citizenship and it cannot be forcibly taken away by the government.171 
                                                                
163Mackenzie, 239 U.S. at 311.  Although the Court recognized that Congress had power 
over citizenship, it conceded that a change of citizenship could not be arbitrarily imposed 
without concurrence of the citizen.  Id.  The Perez decision rejected any requirement of intent 
on the part of the citizen and gave full power to denationalize to Congress.  Perez, 356. U.S. at 
61.  
164Perez, 356 U.S. at 61. 
165Id. at 60. 
166Id.  The Court considered the government’s power to regulate foreign affairs to be 
broad and applied a “rational nexus” test that would accept Congress’ claim of an implied 
power if any reasonable connection to the express power could be drawn.  Id. at 58.  This 
interpretation of the Necessary and Proper clause has been questioned.  See Gordon, supra 
note 150, at 337 (recognizing that this may raise fears of despotism); Boudin, supra note 41, at 
1528 (noting the inconsistency with the view of a government of enumerated powers).   
167See Afroyim, 387 U.S. 253; Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252.   
168See Afroyim, 387 U.S. 253; Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252. 
169U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
170Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 262 (emphases added). 
171See id. at 268. 
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This view of the Fourteenth Amendment protecting citizenship and prohibiting 
denationalization is rooted in the concept of popular sovereignty.172  Chief Justice 
Warren first approached this idea in his pivotal dissenting opinion in Perez.  He 
recognized that the people had created a government endowed with broad powers; 
however, he believed that “the citizens themselves are sovereign, and their 
citizenship is not subject to the general powers of their government.”173  Regardless 
of the powers of Congress to regulate citizens’ conduct, “a government of the people 
cannot take away their citizenship simply because one branch of that government can 
be said to have a conceivably rational basis for wanting to do so.”174 In Afroyim, the 
Supreme Court adopted Chief Justice Warren’s dissent as its majority opinion, thus 
establishing the principle that the Fourteenth Amendment places citizenship outside 
the power of Congress.175   
Based on the Fourteenth Amendment’s unambiguous protection of citizenship, 
both Warren’s Perez dissent and Afroyim specifically reject the idea that Congress 
has any power, express or implied, to denationalize.176  The Constitution “grants 
Congress no express power to strip people of their citizenship, whether in the 
exercise of the implied power to regulate foreign affairs or in the exercise of any 
specifically granted power.”177  Following this principle, any attempt by the 
government through Patriot Act II to revive denationalization based on the power of 
protecting national security or the war power would be unconstitutional.178   
The drafters of Patriot Act II have sought to avoid the implication of 
denationalization by stating in their proposal that Section 501 would merely add 
“joining or providing material support to a terrorist organization” to the list of 
expatriating acts.179  If, however, Congress is officially presented with Patriot Act II 
it should consider the purpose behind this proposal.  The Department of Justice has 
said that Patriot Act II will be an “additional tool to protect the American people.”180  
This goes beyond the formal recognition of a citizen’s voluntary renouncement of 
citizenship to using denationalization as a weapon in the war on terror.181  Further 
evidence that Patriot Act II goes beyond expatriating to denationalizing in violation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment is shown by Section 501’s reduction of the 
government’s burden to prove intent.182   
                                                                
172See Perez, 356 U.S. at 65 (Warren, C.J., dissenting); Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 268 
(describing the foundation of the United States saying that “citizenry is the country and the 
country is its citizenry”). 
173Perez, 356 U.S. at 65 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). 
174Id. (emphasis in original). 
175Afroyim, 387 U.S. 253. 
176See Perez, 356 U.S. at 66 (Warren, C.J., dissenting); Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 257. 
177Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 257. 
178See Perez, 356 U.S. at 77-78 (Warren, C.J., dissenting); Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 257. 
179See Patriot Act II, supra note 10. 
180See Statement of Barbara Comstock, Director of Public Affairs, supra note 147. 
181See generally Mariner, supra note 9. 
182See Patriot Act II, supra note 10. 
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B.  Patriot Act II Improperly Reduces the Government’s Burden 
to Prove “Intent to Relinquish” Citizenship 
Patriot Act II violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of citizens from 
denationalization by amending the Immigration and Nationality Act to specifically 
provide that committing the expatriating act of “joining or providing material support 
to a terrorist organization” is prima facie evidence that the act was done with the 
intent to relinquish United States citizenship.  Patriot Act II should be recognized as 
unconstitutional because of its attempt to overcome the requirement that, for an act 
to be expatriating, a citizen must intend to renounce citizenship.183  By establishing 
that an act in and of itself is prima facie evidence of intent, Patriot Act II alleviates 
the government’s burden to prove by a preponderance of evidence that a citizen had 
the intent to relinquish citizenship.184  By creating the presumption that conduct alone 
can be conclusive evidence of an intent to relinquish citizenship, Patriot Act II has 
rejected clear Supreme Court precedent and has crossed the line from recognizing 
expatriation to denationalization.185  Without a clear intent on the part of the citizen 
to relinquish his citizenship, any act by the government to revoke that citizenship is 
denationalization, not expatriation.186 
In Afroyim, the Supreme Court established the governing principle that Congress 
has no power under the Constitution to unilaterally strip people of their citizenship.187  
Essential to the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of citizenship is the principle 
that a citizen retains his citizenship unless he voluntarily relinquishes it.188  In 
Terrazas, the Court expanded its view and pronounced that expatriation requires 
both a voluntary act and an intent to relinquish citizenship through the act.189  The 
Court then established that the burden is on the government to prove such intent by a 
preponderance of the evidence.190  In making this ruling, the Court firmly rejected the 
idea that the government could use committing an expatriating act as a presumption 
of an intent to renounce citizenship.191 The Court stated that “we are confident that it 
would be inconsistent with Afroyim to treat the expatriating acts specified in  
§ 1481(a) as the equivalent of or as conclusive evidence of the indispensable 
voluntary assent of the citizen.”192   
                                                                
183See Terrazas, 444 U.S. at 268. 
184See generally Mariner, supra note 9 (addressing the serious concern raised by inferring 
intent to relinquish citizenship from conduct). 
185See Terrazas, 444 U.S. at 268. 
186See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967). 
187See id. 
188Id. at 268. 
189Terrazas, 444 U.S. at 260.  The Court stated that such intent can be “expressed in words 
or . . . found as a fair inference from proved conduct.”  Id.    
190Id. at 268. 
191Id. at 260-61. 
192Id. at 261. 
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The Court denied the government the right to infer intent based solely on conduct 
because it is contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment: 
[T]he intent of the Fourteenth Amendment, among other things, was to 
define citizenship; and as interpreted in Afroyim, that definition cannot 
coexist with a congressional power to specify acts that work a 
renunciation of citizenship even absent an intent to renounce.  In the last 
analysis, expatriation depends on the will of the citizen rather than on the 
will of Congress and its assessment of his conduct.193 
Although the Court stated that any of the specified expatriating acts “may be highly 
persuasive evidence in the particular case of a purpose to abandon citizenship,”194 the 
Court resolved that “the trier of fact must in the end conclude that the citizen not 
only voluntarily committed to expatriating act prescribed by statute, but also 
intended to relinquish his citizenship.”195  Further, the burden is on the government to 
prove intent by a preponderance of the evidence.196  
Patriot Act II clearly contradicts this precedent by seeking to establish that 
joining or providing material support to a terrorist organization is prima facie 
evidence of an intent to relinquish United States citizenship.197 Any attempts by the 
government to create a presumption of intent to relinquish citizenship shifts the 
burden of proof to the citizen, forcing him to prove that he did not have such intent 
to save his citizenship.  This would allow the government to denationalize citizens if 
they are unable to overcome the presumption of intent and demonstrate that they did 
not intend to relinquish citizenship.198  Critics of Patriot Act II have pointed to the 
difficulties that citizens may have in overcoming the presumption of intent due to 
courts’ recent deference to the government’s “factual assessments” relating to 
terrorism.199  Patriot Act II’s proposal to alleviate the government’s burden to prove 
intent to relinquish citizenship is inconsistent with the standard set in Terrazas, and 
is, therefore, unconstitutional.200 
                                                                
193Id. at 260. 
194Id. at 261 (quoting Nishikawa, 356 U.S. at 139 (Black, J., concurring)). 
195Id. 
196Id. at 268. 
197See Patriot Act II, supra note 10.  Notably, Section 501 specifically singles out “joining 
or providing material support to terrorists” and serving in foreign army engaged in hostilities 
with the United States to be the only acts that would be considered prima facie evidence of 
intent to relinquish citizenship, while leaving the evidentiary standard for all the other 
established expatriating acts listed in the Immigration and Nationality Act unchanged.  Id.  
This raises the question of why the act of joining or providing material support to a terrorist 
group would be presumptive of an intent to relinquish citizenship while all of the other long-
standing expatriating acts are not.  
198See generally Mariner, supra note 9. 
199Id. 
200See Terrazas, 444 U.S. at 268. 
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C.  Patriot Act II’s Use of Denationalization as a Punishment  
is Unconstitutional Under the Eighth Amendment 
Beyond its violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by attempting to strip 
Americans of their citizenship without their assent, Patriot Act II is also 
unconstitutional because it uses denationalization as a punishment.  In Trop v. 
Dulles, the Supreme Court held that statutes which provide for denationalization as a 
punishment are unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.201  In reaching its 
decision, the Court again emphasized the value of citizenship and concluded that 
“the deprivation of citizenship is not a weapon that the Government may use to 
express its displeasure at a citizen’s conduct, however reprehensible that conduct 
may be.”202  An examination of Section 501 of Patriot Act II shows that the purpose 
of this legislation is to punish citizens that are convicted of terrorist acts.203  Such 
legislation is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment and should not be enacted. 
Because the Eighth Amendment only applies to statutes that impose penalties, the 
Trop Court first examined what makes a statute penal in nature.204  The Court stated 
that the inquiry should be directed at the substance of the statute rather than its form, 
and a statute that appears to be a regulation on its face cannot avoid scrutiny simply 
because it is labeled as “non-penal.”205  The test for determining whether or not a law 
is penal is based on “the purpose of the statute.  If the statute imposes a disability for 
the purposes of punishment – that is, to reprimand the wrongdoer, to deter others, 
etc. – it [is] considered penal.”206  The statute in question in Trop provided that a 
person would lose his citizenship for conviction of wartime desertion.207  Applying 
this test, the Court concluded that the purpose of the statute was simply to punish the 
convicted deserter and, therefore, the statute was a penal law.208   
Evaluating Section 501 of Patriot Act II under this test evinces that it is a punitive 
measure and should be treated as such.  The drafters of this proposed legislation have 
not commented on their purpose for seeking to denationalize terrorists other than 
vague assertions of protecting national security.209  A study of this proposal in 
                                                                
201356 U.S. 86. 
202See id. at 92-93. 
203See Patriot Act II, supra note 10. 
204See Trop, 356 U.S. at 95. 
205Id. at 94-95. 
206Trop, 356 U.S. at 96.  In another case involving denationalization as a punishment, 
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, the Court provided a series of factors that can be considered 
in determining if a statute is punitive including: (1) whether the sanction involves an 
affirmative disability or restraint, (2) whether it has historically been regarded as a 
punishment, (3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, (4) whether its 
operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment – retribution and deterrence, (5) 
whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, (6) whether an alternative purpose 
to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and (7) whether it appears 
excessive in relation to the alternative purposed assigned.  372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). 
207See Trop, 356 U.S. at 88.   
208Id. at 97. 
209See Statement of Barbara Comstock, Director of Public Affairs, supra note 147. 
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context, however, leads to the reasonable conclusion that its purpose is to provide 
another method to punish those convicted of terrorist acts and not some other 
legitimate purpose.  First, terrorism and providing material support to terrorists are 
already crimes that are subject to severe penalties.210  By adding denationalization as 
another penalty, the government seeks to add further punishment to citizens that have 
already been convicted of a crime.211  This is similar to the statute that was struck 
down as unconstitutional in Trop.  Second, the majority of the expatriating acts listed 
in the Immigration and Nationality Act have a regulatory purpose and are used to 
clarify a person’s citizenship status when he or she has transferred allegiance to 
another country.212  In contrast,  Patriot Act II revokes citizenship from Americans 
that are connected to terrorist groups rather than to any foreign country.213  Thus, 
there is serious doubt as to any legitimate regulatory purpose behind the proposal. 
Finally, Section 501 should be considered not just individually, but also in the 
context of Patriot Act II as a whole.  It is important to note that Section 501 is 
inserted among a series of other sections that propose numerous increases in criminal 
penalties related to terrorism.214  For example, Section 501 is immediately followed 
by Section 502: Enhanced Criminal Penalties for Violations of Immigration and 
Nationality Act.215  In this context, it is clear that Patriot Act II is using 
denationalization as a punitive measure to punish citizens who are connected to 
terrorists organizations.  Because Patriot Act II uses denationalization as a 
punishment it is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.216 
The Court in Trop interpreted the Eighth Amendment and concluded that “the 
basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of 
man.”217  The Court held that denationalization is a cruel and unusual punishment 
under the Eighth Amendment because it creates “the total destruction of the 
                                                                
21018 U.S.C. §§ 2332, 2339A (2003). 
211See generally Mariner, supra note 9. 
212See John P. Roche, The Expatriation Cases: “Breathes There the Man, With Soul So 
Dead . . . ?”, 1963 SUP. CT. REV. 325, 337 (1963).  Roche states that the government has used 
two categories of expatriating acts. One category provides for loss of citizenship for 
Americans who have shifted their allegiance to a foreign country and the other category based 
on punishing “Bad Americans” by depriving them of citizenship.  Id. 
213This would include both domestic and international terrorist organizations.  See Patriot 
Act II, supra note 10. 
214See Patriot Act II, supra note 10. 
215Id.  Other examples of sections proposing increased penalties include among several 
others: Section 411: Penalties for terrorist murders; Section 421: Increased Penalties for 
Terrorist Financing; Section 424: Denial of Federal Benefits to Terrorists; and Section 503: 
Inadmissibility and Removability of National Security Aliens or Criminally Charged Aliens.  
Id. 
216Trop, 356 U.S. at 103. 
217Id. at 100.  The court recognized that the government does have the power to punish, 
even with death, but that this does not mean that any punishment less is acceptable: “[I]t is 
equally plain that the existence of the death penalty is not a license to the Government to 
devise any punishment short of death within the limit of its imagination . . . any technique 
outside the bounds of [the] traditional penalties is constitutionally suspect.  Id. at 99-100. 
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individual’s status in organized society.”218  The Court based its decision on its 
contempt for the statelessness that may result from denationalization and its belief in 
the priceless value of citizenship.219  A brief study of the concerns of the Trop Court 
relating to statelessness and the value of citizenship shows that Patriot Act II would 
have serious negative impacts in both of these areas.  Thus, an Eighth Amendment 
ban on Patriot Act II’s use of denationalization as punishment is well founded. 
1.  The Problem of Statelessness 
By revoking citizenship from Americans who are connected to terrorist groups, 
Patriot Act II has the potential to create a serious problem of statelessness.  
Statelessness is “the legal condition of being without a nationality.”220  It results 
when a citizen losses his nationality without acquiring a new nationality.221  While 
other expatriating acts provided in the Immigration and Nationality Act are generally 
used as a way to transfer a citizen’s allegiance from one country to another, Patriot 
Act II’s proposal to use denationalization as a punishment for terrorism may revoke 
citizenship of Americans who have no ties to any foreign country.222  This will leave 
these citizens as stateless and treated as aliens in their own country.223 
In Trop, the Court firmly denounced the use of denationalization as a punishment 
that creates stateless persons, considering such punishment to be “offensive to 
cardinal principles for which the Constitution stands.”224  The Court contemplated 
the perilous situation that is faced by the stateless person: 
His very existence is at the sufferance of the country in which he happens 
to find himself.  While any one country may accord him some rights, and 
presumably as long as he remained in this country he would enjoy the 
limited rights of an alien, no country need do so because he is stateless.  
Furthermore, his enjoyment of even the limited rights of an alien might be 
subject to termination at any time by reason of deportation.  In short, the 
expatriate has lost the right to have rights.225   
The Court believed that the never-ending fear and distress that is caused by 
statelessness makes it a cruel and unusual punishment.226  Further, even if a stateless 
person never faces any of these consequences, the threat alone “makes the 
punishment obnoxious.”227   
                                                                
218Id. at 101. 
219Id. at 101-02. 
220See Jeffrey L. Blackman, State Successions and Statelessness: The Emerging Right to 
an Effective Nationality Under International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1141, 1176 (1998). 
221Id. at 1177. 
222See Patriot Act II, supra note 10. 
223See Gordon, supra note 150, at 346. 
224Trop, 356 U.S. at 102. 
225Id. at 101-02. 
226Id. at 102. 
227Id. 
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Not only has American law rejected the creation of statelessness, but 
international law also vehemently opposes such a condition.228  While some have 
questioned the gravity of a stateless person’s loss of citizenship,229 statelessness has 
been a serious problem around the world with stateless persons facing violations of 
their basic human rights.230  In its Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations 
has announced its position against statelessness by declaring that “everyone has the 
right to a nationality” and that “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his 
nationality.”231  Patriot Act II’s attempt to revive denationalization runs contrary to 
both the United States and the International community’s condemnation of creating 
statelessness.   
The idea that denationalization causes a citizen to become “a man without a 
country” is a major contributing factor in the Court’s conclusion that 
denationalization is a cruel and unusual punishment.232  Patriot Act II has the clear 
potential to render Americans stateless by revoking their citizenship for terrorism 
when they have not transferred allegiance to any foreign country.233  This supports 
the conclusion that it is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment as a cruel and 
unusual punishment. 
2.  The Value of Citizenship 
The Court’s decision in Trop that denationalization is a cruel and unusual 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment is rooted in the idea that citizenship is a 
person’s most valuable, fundamental right.234  The Court considers citizenship to be 
the equivalent to a person’s social and political identity.235  Denationalization is a 
cruel and unusual punishment because it is the “total destruction of the individual’s 
                                                                
228See Spectar, supra note 23, at 295-96. 
229See Gordon, supra note 150, at 346.  Gordon questions the impact that a change in a 
person’s status to stateless would really have and states that the main loss of rights would be 
loss of the right to vote, to hold public office, to work in certain professions and to face 
deportation.  Id. 
230See Spectar, supra note 23, at 296. 
231Id. at 297 (quoting the United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights); see 
also, Blackman, supra note 220, at 1178. 
232In Afroyim, the Court also addressed its concern about the potential for 
denationalization to create statelessness.  387 U.S. at 268.  The Court stated that “[i]n some 
instances, loss of citizenship can mean that a man is left without the protection of citizenship 
in any country in the world – as a man without a country.”  Id. 
233It is important to reemphasize that Patriot Act II makes no distinction between domestic 
and foreign terrorist organizations, and the definition for terrorism that it uses is incredibly 
broad.  See Patriot Act II, supra note 10.  This may lead to targeting citizens who are involved 
in domestic political or activist groups that are disfavored by the government being labeled as 
terrorists and, thus, facing denationalization even though there is no connection to a foreign 
country.  See Edgar, supra note 114, at 6. 
234Trop, 356 U.S. 86.  Chief Justice Warren stated that “[w]hen the Government acts to 
take away the fundamental right of citizenship, the safeguards of the Constitution should be 
examined with special diligence.”  Id. at 103. 
235Id. at 101. 
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status in organized society.  It is a form of punishment more primitive than torture, 
for it destroys for the individual the political existence that was centuries in the 
development.  The punishment strips the citizen of his status in the national and 
international political community.”236  The use of denationalization to take away, in 
essence, a person’s societal existence ignores the “basic concept underlying the Eight 
Amendment [which] is nothing less than the dignity of man” and is, thus, a cruel and 
unusual punishment.237 
The concern over protecting citizenship because it is a most precious right has 
been the prevailing theme throughout the Court’s decisions prohibiting 
denationalization.238  In his dissent in Perez, which has been adopted as the opinion 
of the Court, Chief Justice Warren described citizenship as “the constitutional 
birthright of every person born in this country” and as “man’s basic right for it is 
nothing less than the right to have rights.  Remove this priceless possession and there 
remains a stateless person, disgraced and degraded in the eyes of his countrymen.”239  
In Afroyim, the Court reiterated the fundamental basic value of citizenship stating 
that it “is no light trifle to be jeopardized any moment Congress decides to do so 
under the mane of one of its general or implied grants of power.”240   This concept of 
citizenship as man’s basic right is supported by both the theoretical and historical 
interpretations of citizenship.241   
Despite the overwhelming recognition for the fundamental value of citizenship, 
there has been some speculation as to the real harm that Americans would face if 
they have their citizenship revoked.242  It has been suggested that Chief Justice 
Warren’s characterization of citizenship “is a dramatic overstatement of the 
                                                                
236Id. 
237Id. at 100. 
238See id.; Afroyim, 387 U.S. 253; Terrazas, 444 U.S. at 268 .  See also Griffith, supra note 
17, at 453-54 (discussing how the concern in the expatriation cases centered on the extent of 
protection that was to be provided for the basic right of citizenship). 
239Perez, 356 U.S. at 66 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).  Chief Justice Warren’s concern for the 
value of citizenship is connected to the plight of the stateless person, who “has no lawful claim 
to protection from any nation, and no nation may assert rights on his behalf.”  Id.   
240Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 267-68. 
241See Gordon, supra note 150, at 316.  In considering the meaning of citizenship, Gordon 
states: 
Citizenship is a somewhat nebulous term, with roots deep in antiquity.  It is a 
generalization which denotes full membership in the clan, the state or the society.  To 
most of us such membership is a proud and comforting possession . . . . Citizenship 
confers a status which summons rights, privileges and obligations, and in a society as 
powerful and beneficent as that of the United States, this may be a status of 
inestimable value.  The manner in which such status can be lost, or in which the 
citizen can be deprived of it, obviously is a matter of crucial concern to all. 
Id.  See also Aleinikoff, supra note 24, at 1484-98 (analyzing several perspectives on 
citizenship including a citizenship under a “rights” perspective). 
242See Gordon, supra note 150, at 346.  Gordon questions the real gravity of 
denationalized citizens’ loss, and suggests that the characterizations of the harm they face may 
be too extreme.  Id. 
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importance of citizenship in the United States today.”243  This argument views 
citizenship as just a title, the loss of which has no real impact because aliens in the 
United States are provided many of the same rights as citizens.244 
Citizenship is still a valuable right for all Americans that needs to be protected 
from attempts by the government to revoke citizenship.245  That a person’s status as 
an American citizen is still incredibly important is evident through the current 
situation involving the detention of enemy combatants in connection with the war on 
terror.246  Patriot Act II’s attempt to revoke Americans’ citizenship in the name of 
national security has renewed the need to recognize citizenship as Americans’ most 
fundamental and precious right.247 
Patriot Act II’s attempt to revive allowing the government to denationalize 
citizens for any connection to a terrorist group has raised serious concerns about the 
real purpose behind this proposal.248  It is important to consider why the government 
is attempting to assert the power to strip Americans of their citizenship for 
involvement with a terrorist organization when such acts are already subject to 
severe criminal penalties.249  Critics of Patriot Act II have suggested that the real 
purpose behind this proposal is that by giving the government the power to 
denationalize citizens, they will then have the power to deport or indefinitely detain 
these individuals who will then be treated as aliens.250    
                                                                
243See Aleinikoff, supra note 24, at 1486. 
244See Gordon, supra note 150, at 346; see also Aleinikoff, supra note 24, at 1486 (stating 
that aliens are entitled to the majority of benefits of citizens, but also recognizing certain 
benefits provided solely to citizens such as the ability to travel on a U.S. passport, the right to 
receive protection from the U.S. government overseas, the right to vote and the right to hold 
office).  
245See generally Lewis & Mayle, supra note 1; Mariner, supra note 9; Hetnoff, supra note 
114. 
246As part of the war on terrorism, the government has been detaining over six hundred 
men who are suspected of being enemy combatants of the United States.  See Bill Mears, 
Supreme Court Will Hear First Appeals involving Guantanamo Detainees, CNN Washington 
Bureau (Nov. 11, 2003) available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/11/10/scotus.detainees/ 
(last visited Feb.19, 2004).  There has been a great debate about the legal protection that such 
enemy combatants should receive.  Initially, courts have denied access to the alien 
Guantanamo Bay detainees, holding that the United States has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of 
habeas corpus for aliens that are detained outside the sovereignty of the United States.  See 
Khaled A. F. al Ohah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003).  However, the 
American terrorist suspects, Jose Padilla and Yaser Hamdi, as American citizens, have been 
granted access to the legal system.  In Padilla’s case, the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit granted a writ of habeas corpus.  See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003).  
This situation shows that status as a citizen is of vital importance to those who are accused by 
the government of involvement in terrorism.  This has been suggested as a reason why the 
government wants the power to revoke citizenship.  See Mariner, supra note 9. 
247See generally Lewis & Mayle, supra note 1; Mariner, supra note 9; Hetnoff, supra note 
114. 
248Hetnoff, supra note 114. 
249See Mariner, supra note 9. 
250See Hetnoff, supra note 114; Edgar, supra note 114. 
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Patriot Act II is attempting to use denationalization as a weapon in the war on 
terror by punishing citizens who are connected to terrorist groups.251  This goes 
against the clear statement in Trop that “the deprivation of citizenship is not a 
weapon that the Government may use” against citizens.252  The value of citizenship is 
still recognized by the Constitution, which protects it from being taken by the 
government.253  Thus, under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Patriot Act II’s 
proposal to allow the government to strip Americans of their citizenship for 
connection to a terrorist group should be recognized as unconstitutional.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
After the leak of Patriot Act II to the public by the Center for Public Integrity, the 
Department of Justice released a statement claiming that its deliberations in 
considering new anti-terrorism measures “are always undertaken with the strongest 
commitment to our Constitution and civil liberties.”254  Section 501, however, clearly 
seeks to overcome the constitutional prohibition against denationalization and revive 
stripping Americans of their citizenship in the name of national security and the war 
on terrorism. 
A review of the history of denationalization in America has shown that any past 
deference to Congress regarding revocation of citizenship without the citizen’s 
assent has been replaced by a full protection of Americans from denationalization.  
The Supreme Court has declared that denationalization is unconstitutional under both 
the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments.   Section 501 of Patriot Act II violates both 
of these amendments because it seeks to revoke citizenship from Americans who 
have no intention to relinquish their citizenship and it uses this denationalization as a 
punishment against those persons that the government finds have a connection to 
terrorism.  
Citizenship remains Americans’ most fundamental right, and citizens should 
continue to receive full protection as demanded by the Constitution.  If Congress is 
presented with Patriot Act II in its present form, it should reject Section 501 as an 
unconstitutional attempt to revive denationalization.  
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251See Statement of Barbara Comstock, Director of Public Affairs, supra note 147.  The 
Department of Justice refers to this proposal as a “tool” to protect Americans.  Id. 
252Trop, 356 U.S. at 92-93. 
253See id.; Afroyim, 387 U.S. 253. 
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